Abstract: The single crossing property plays a crucial role in economic theory, yet there are important instances where the property cannot be directly assumed or easily derived. Difficulties often arise because the property cannot be aggregated: the sum or convex combination of two functions with the single crossing property need not have that property. We introduce a new condition characterizing when the single crossing property is stable under aggregation and also identify sufficient conditions for the preservation of the single crossing property under multidimensional aggregation. We use our results to establish properties of objective functions (convexity, logsupermodularity), the monotonicity of optimal decisions under uncertainty, and the existence of monotone equilibria in Bayesian-games.
Introduction
Consider the following problem, pervasive in comparative statics analysis: an agent chooses the action x ∈ X ⊂ R to maximize her objective V (x; s), where s ∈ S ⊂ R is some parameter; how does argmax x∈X V (x; s) vary with s? It is well-known that argmax x∈X V (x; s) increases with s if the family {V (·; s)} s∈S obeys single crossing differences; this means that, for any x > x , the function δ(s) = V (x ; s) − V (x ; s) has the single crossing property, in the sense that δ crosses the horizontal axis just once, from negative to positive, as s increases (see Milgrom and Shannon (1994) ).
1 This simple but powerful result is useful when one is interested in comparative statics for its own sake (for example, when considering an agent's portfolio allocation problem) or when monotonicity is needed for establishing some other result (like equilibrium existence in supermodular games (see Milgrom and Roberts (1990) and Vives (1990) ).
However, single crossing differences cannot always be directly assumed or easily derived from primitive assumptions. We give two such cases.
Case 1. Consider an agent who maximizes expected payoff V (x; s) = T v(x; s, t) dF (t),
where t represents possible states of the world and F the distribution over those states.
Suppose, for any given t, {v(·; s, t)} s∈S obeys single crossing differences, so that the optimal action increases with parameter s if the state t is known; in general, this is not sufficient to guarantee that {V (·; s)} s∈S obeys single crossing differences, so we cannot conclude that argmax x∈X V (x; s) increases with s.
Notice that this difficulty will not arise if {v(·; s, t)} s∈S obeys increasing differences, i.e., if
v(x , s, t) − v(x , s, t) is increasing in s at any t, since ∆(s) will then be increasing in s as well. However, increasing differences is often too strong an assumption. For example, suppose v(x, s, t) = h(Π(x, s, t)) where h is the agent's Bernoulli utility function and Π(x, s, t) is the monetary payoff in state t and parameter s. If {Π(·; s, t)} s∈S obeys increasing differences, then {v(·; s, t)} s∈S will obey single crossing differences, but will not typically have increasing differences (unless h is linear). is the distribution of s −i conditional on observing s i . The existence of a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium where each player plays a monotone strategy (i.e., a strategy where the action increases with the player's signal) hinges on whether a particular player has an optimal strategy that is monotone, given that other players are playing monotone strategies (see Athey (2001) While these problems may be solved in specific contexts using various ad hoc techniques, there has been no attempt at developing a general theory that addresses them systematically.
We think that these problems are best understood as arising from the fact that the single crossing property is not preserved with aggregation; i.e., the sum of two functions with the single crossing property does not generally add up to another function with this property.
In this paper, we characterize the conditions under which the single crossing property is preserved with aggregation. We show that any weighted sum of two functions with the single crossing property also has this property if and only if the ratio of these functions is monotone in a particular sense; we refer to this relation between functions as signedratio monotonicity. Applying our results, we find the conditions under which a risk averse monopolist who faces uncertainty in demand will increase output when there is a fall in marginal cost. This is an instance of a Case 1 problem. For a Case 2 problem, we look at a Bertrand oligopoly with risk averse firms selling differentiated products, where each firm receives a signal on the state of demand for his output. We find conditions under which each firm's pricing decision is monotone in the signal he receives, given that other firms are playing monotone strategies. Finally, we illustrate how our results can be used to check that a function is quasiconcave or concave-convex; note that the former can be characterized as a function with a single crossing first derivative and the latter as a function with a single crossing second derivative.
Aggregating single crossing functions
Let (S, ≥) be a partially ordered set; a function f : S → R is said to have the single crossing property if it satisfies the following:
When S is an interval of R, the graph of f is a curve that crosses the horizontal axis just once, hence the term 'single crossing'. We refer to a function that obeys the single crossing property as a single crossing function or an SC function.
It is easy to see that the sum of two single crossing functions is not necessarily a single crossing function. 2 This section is devoted to identifying the condition under which the single crossing property is preserved with aggregation. Consider two single-crossing functions f and g defined on the partially ordered set (S, ≥).
Definition 1 We say that f and g obey signed-ratio monotonicity if they satisfy the following 2 For example, take f (s) = sin(s) + 2 and g(s) = −2.
conditions: (a) at any s ∈ S, such that g(s ) < 0 and f (s ) > 0, we have
(b) at any s ∈ S, such that f (s ) < 0 and g(s ) > 0, we have
The significance of this property is clear from the following result.
Proposition 1. Let f and g be two SC functions. Then αf + βg is an SC function for any nonnegative scalars α and β if and only if f and g obey signed-ratio monotonicity.
Proof: Suppose g(s ) < 0 and f (s ) > 0 and let α = −g(s )/f (s ), so that α f (s )+g(s ) = 0.
Since α f + g is an SC function, α f (s ) + g(s ) ≥ 0 for s > s . Re-arranging this inequality and bearing in mind that f (s ) > 0 (since f is an S function and f (s ) > 0), we obtain
For the proof of the converse we may, without loss of generality, assume that β = 1 (since the single crossing property is preserved under positive scalar multiplication). Suppose
If g(s ) ≥ 0 and f (s ) ≥ 0, then we have g(s ) ≥ 0 and f (s ) ≥ 0 since f and g are SC functions. It follows that αf (s ) + g(s ) ≥ 0. This inequality is strict if (3) is a strict
Now consider the case where (3) holds but one of the two functions is negative at s . Suppose
where the first inequality follows from (3) and the second from signed-ratio monotonicity.
Re-arranging this inequality, we obtain αf
f is an SC function and f (s ) > 0.) QED It is easy to check that two increasing functions obey signed-ratio monotonicity, as one would expect, since any positive linear combination of increasing functions is increasing (and thus a single crossing function). For another illustration of Proposition 1, suppose S = R, f (s) = s 2 + 1, and g(s) = s 3 . In this case f is not increasing, but any positive linear combination of f and g is still an SC function. We can confirm this by checking that f and g have signed-ratio monotonicity: for s > 0, we have −g(s)/f (s) < 0, while for s < 0, the ratio −g(s)/f (s) = −s 3 /(s 2 + 1) is positive and decreasing in s. Now consider a third function h(s) = e −s ; since this function is positive for all s, h and f have signedratio monotonicity, but it is easy to check that this is not the case for h and g. Therefore,
signed-ratio monotonicity is not a transitive relation between functions (though it is clearly reflexive and symmetric).
The next result extends Proposition 1; it says that any positive linear combination of a family single crossing functions is also a single crossing function, so long as members of the family obey signed-ratio monotonicity pairwise. The proof can be found in the Appendix.
Theorem 1. Let (T, Σ) be a measurable space and suppose that for each s ∈ S, f (s, t) is a bounded and measurable function of t ∈ T . Then
for any finite measure µ on (T, Σ) if the following condition holds: for each t, t ∈ T , the pair of functions f (s, t) and f (s, t ) of s ∈ S satisfy signed-ratio monotonicity. This condition is also necessary if Σ contains all singleton sets.
When applying Theorem 1 to establish monotone comparative statics, T will typically be interpreted as the set of possible states of the world. In situations where these states could be represented by a one-dimensional random variable, the assumption of pairwise signed-ratio monotonicity is often reasonable. However, in certain applications T is necessarily multidimensional. For example, establishing the monotonicity of a player's action with respect to his type in an n-player Bayesian game will involve interpreting t as the vector of types of other players in the game. In this case, signed-ratio monotonicity for all possible pairs t and t is a very strong condition. The next theorem gets round this difficulty by imposing more structure on T and requiring signed-ratio monotonicity only for ordered pairs of t and t .
Theorem 2. Let (T i , Σ i , µ i ) (for i = 1, 2, ...n) be finite measure spaces such that T i ⊆ R and let f : S × T → R be a bounded and measurable function of t ∈ T = Π n i=1 T i and an SC function of (s, t). Suppose that ∀i, ∀s ∈ S, and ∀t > t , (i) the functions f (s, t ) and f (s, t ) of s ∈ S satisfy signed-ratio monotonicity and (ii) the functions f (s , t i , t −i ) and f (s , t i , t −i ) of t i ∈ T i satisfy signed-ratio monotonicity. Then F (s) = T f (s, t)dµ(t) (where µ is the product measure) is an SC function.
Remark: It is straightforward to check that if f obeys (i) and (ii) the so doesf (s, t) = f (s, t)h(s, t) where h is a logsupermodular function of (s, t).
3 Therefore, Theorem 2 tells us that the map
is also an SC function. In particular, F is an SC function if f is increasing in (s, t). In the context of Bayesian games, µ is the Lebesgue measure, h is the posterior density function on the types of other players, conditional on the player receiving signal s; h will be logsupermodular if types are assumed to be affiliated.
Applications of the aggregation theorems
Example 1. A quasiconvex function defined on an interval I in R can be characterized as a function with a derivative that is a single crossing function, while a function on I is concaveconvex 4 if its second derivative has the single crossing property. Theorem 1 provides a useful way of checking that a function has such properties. For example, the convex-concave property of the function G(s) = as
and d > 1, plays an important role in the entry-exit model of Dixit (1989) .
. Since f (s) < 0 and g(s) > 0, both f and g are SC functions. While f is an increasing function, g may be increasing or decreasing, depending on the value of d.
Nonetheless, it is easy to check that these functions satisfy signed-ratio monotonicity. Hence −G is an SC function and G is a convex-concave function.
For another simple example, consider the profit function Π(x) = xP (x) − C(x), where P is the inverse demand function and C the cost function. It is known that Π is quasiconcave if P is positive, decreasing, and log-concave and C is convex. To recover this result, note that
, where f (x) = −P (x) and g(x) = −xP (x) + C (x). It is easy to check that the conditions on P and C imply that f and g satisfy signed-ratio monotonicity and so Π has the single crossing property.
Example 2. Theorem 2 implies the well-known result that logsupermodularity is preserved under integration (see Karlin and Rinott (1980) ); for economic applications of this result see Jewitt (1991) , Gollier (2001) and Athey (2001) ). In the statement below, X = Π m i=1 X i and Y = Π n j=1 Y j , where X i (for i = 1, 2, ..., m) are subsets of R and Y j (for j = 1, 2, ..., n) are 3 The precise property of h we need (which makes sense even when S is not a lattice) is the following: ∀i, ∀s ∈ S, and ∀t > t , h(s, t )/h(s, t ) is increasing in s and h(s , t i , t −i )/h(s , t i , t −i ) is increasing in t i .
4 By this we mean that there iss ∈ I such that f is concave for s <s and convex for s >s. 5 In that model, s is the price of the product and G represents the difference in the continuation value between being in and out of the market.
nonempty compact intervals of R.
Corollary 1. Let φ be a function from X × Y to the positive real numbers such that, for any x, φ(x, ·) is a bounded and measurable function of y ∈ Y . If φ is logsupermodular in (x, y) then Φ, defined by Φ(x) = Y φ(x, y)dy is a logsupermodular function.
Proof: Let K ⊂ M = {1, 2, ...m}, and suppose a > a , for a and a in Π i∈K X i . Let
Define the function G :
Note that the integrand may be written as
The term in the square brackets is increasing in (b, y) (because φ is logsupermodular); so
which establishes the logsupermodularity of Φ. QED Example 3. This is an application of Theorem 1 to an instance of a Case 1 problem we discussed in the Introduction. A firm has to decide on its optimal output level x > 0. Its profit function is Π(x; s) = xP (x) − C(x; s), where P is the inverse demand function and C(·; s) is the cost function, parameterized by s in (S, ≥). It is well-known that a decrease in marginal cost leads to a rise in the profit-maximizing output. To model this formally, assume that the family {C(·; s)} s∈S obeys decreasing differences; by this we mean that, for all x > x , the difference C(x ; s) − C(x ; s) is decreasing in s. If C is differentiable, this is equivalent to marginal cost dC/dx decreasing with s. It follows that {Π(·; s)} s∈S obeys increasing (hence, single crossing) differences, so an application of Milgrom and Shannon's monotone comparative statics theorem guarantees that the profit-maximizing output increases with s.
Now consider a more general setting where the firm faces uncertainty over the demand for its output. We assume that the profit at state t ∈ T ⊂ R is given by Π(x; s, t) = xP (x; t) − C(x; s)
and that the firm maximizes V (x; s) = T h (Π(x; s, t)) λ(t) dt, where λ(t) is the subjective probability of state t and h : R → R is the Bernoulli utility function representing the monopolist's attitude towards uncertainty. We would like to identify conditions under which {V (·; s)} s∈S obeys single crossing differences, so that we could guarantee that the optimal output level increases with s. In other words, for any x > x , we require
to be an SC function. For each t, δ(s, t) = h (Π(x ; s, t)) − h (Π(x ; s, t) is an SC function of s if {C(·; s)} s∈S obeys decreasing differences. However, unless h is linear, δ will not in general be increasing in s. Hence we face a problem of precisely the type that Theorem 1 is meant to address. Theorem 1 says that ∆ is an SC function if signed-ratio monotonicity holds; the next result gives conditions under which that is satisfied. The proof is in the Appendix.
Proposition 2. Suppose that (i) C is increasing x, decreasing in s, and {C(·; s)} s∈S obeys decreasing differences; (ii) P is decreasing in x and increasing in t and {ln P (·; t)} t∈T obeys increasing differences; and (iii) h : R → R is twice differentiable, with h > 0, and obeys DARA. Then for any t, t ∈ T , the functions δ(s, t) and δ(s, t ) of s obey signed-ratio monotonicity.
Remark: When P is differentiable, {ln P (·; t)} t∈T obeys increasing differences if and only if
Therefore, Condition (ii) says that in a high state, the market clearing price is high and the price elasticity of demand is low. Note also that condition (iii) does not require h to be concave (i.e., the firm need not be risk averse) and even if it were, the firm need not face a concave maximization problem because Π need not be concave in x. Sandmo (1971) considers the behavior of a price-taking firm under uncertainty, with the market price experiencing additive shocks; in our notation, he assumes that P (x; t) =P + t.
He showed that an increase inP leads to higher output if h obeys DARA. This result is a special case of ours since there is no formal difference between a rise in the price of the good by (say) q and fall in its marginal cost by q.
Milgrom (1994) did not specifically examine the question we posed but pointed out that a large class of seemingly distinct comparative statics problems has the same solution because they all rely on the same Spence-Mirrlees condition. A special case of our problem can indeed be solved this way and checking the Spence-Mirrlees condition provides another application of Theorem 1. Indeed, suppose P (x, t) =P (x) + t; by Theorem 1 in Milgrom (1994) , optimal output increases with s if the ratio W x /W y is increasing in s, where W (x, y, s) = h(y + tx − C(x, s))λ(t)dt. To see when this may occur, suppose W x (x, y; s * )/W y (x, y; s
satisfies F (s * ) = 0. Clearly, W x (x, y; s * * )/W y (x, y; s * * ) ≥ α if F is an SC function. By Theorem 1, it suffices that the integrand in (6) is an SC function of s and that any two such functions (at different values of t) obey signed-ratio monotonicity. The reader can check that the conditions of Proposition 2 do imply those properties.
Example 4. This is an application of Theorem 2 to an instance of a Case 2 problem we discussed in the Introduction. Consider a Bertrand oligopoly with n firms, each selling a single differentiated product. We focus our discussion on firm 1 (the situation of the other firms being analogous). Firm 1 has a constant unit cost of production of c 1 ; the demand for its output if it charges price p 1 and the other firms charge p −1 (for their respective products)
is given by D(p 1 , p −1 ; s 1 ), where s 1 is some parameter affecting demand that is observed by firm 1. In general, firm j observes s j but not s k for k = j. At the price vector p = (p 1 , p −1 ) and the parameter s 1 , firm 1's profit is Π(p 1 , p −1 ; s 1 ) = (p 1 − c 1 )D(p 1 , p −1 ; s 1 ). Suppose that firm j = 1 charges the price ψ j (s j ) whenever it observes s j . If so, Firm 1 chooses p 1 to maximize its expected utility
where h is the firm's Bernoulli utility function and λ(·|s 1 ) is the distribution of s −1 , conditional on observing s 1 .
We know from Athey (2001) that a Bayesian Nash equilibrium (with equilibrium decision rules that are increasing in the signal) exists if each firm has an optimal decision rule that is increasing, given that all other firms are playing increasing decision rules. 6 Therefore we are interested in conditions under which argmax p 1 >c 1 V (p 1 ; s 1 ) is increasing in s 1 , which
is an SC function for any p 1 > p 1 > c 1 . Consider in the first instance the case where the agent is risk neutral, so h is the identity function.
Suppose that D is a logsupermodular function of (p 1 , p −1 ; s 1 ). This condition has a very 6 For generalizations of Athey's work, see McAdams (2003) and Reny (2009) .
simple interpretation in terms of the elasticity of demand. Define
the logsupermodularity of D is equivalent to i being increasing in s 1 and in p k for k = i (for all i). It is straightforward to check that if D is (i) increasing in p −1 (so an increase in the price charged by firm k = 1 raises the demand for firm 1's product), (ii) logsupermodular, and (iii) ψ j is increasing for all j = 1, then Π(
If, in addition, λ(·|·) is logsupermodular (which holds if the types are affiliated), then V is logsupermodular in (p 1 ; s 1 ). This in turn guarantees that ∆ is a single crossing function.
When the firm is not risk neutral, ∆ is an SC function if
obeys conditions in (i) and (ii) in Theorem 2 (with s = s 1 and t = s −1 ). The following result (which we prove in the Appendix) gives conditions under which this holds. b) The coefficient of relative risk aversion is bounded above by 1 and is decreasing and, for i = 1, i is increasing in s 1 and in p k for all k = {i, 1};
c) The coefficient of relative risk aversion is bounded below by 1 and is decreasing and, for i = 1, i is decreasing in s 1 and in p k for all k = {i, 1}.
7

Appendix
The proof of Theorem 1 requires the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Let F = {f i } 1≤i≤M be a family of SC functions such that any two members obey signed-ratio monotonicity. Then
Proof: By Proposition 1, we need only show that F = M i=1 f i is an SC function. Suppose that F (s ) ≥ 0; we are required to show that F (s ) ≥ 0 for any s > s . If f i (s ) ≥ 0 for all i, then f i (s ) ≥ 0 for all i, so we obtain F (s ) ≥ 0. Consider next the case where f i (s ) < 0 for some i. In this case, we may partition F into three subsets; for f i ∈ F 1 , we have f i (s ) < 0;
for f i ∈ F 2 , we have f i (s ) > 0; and for f i ∈ F 3 , we have f i (s ) = 0. Clearly, f i (s ) ≥ 0 for f i ∈ F 3 . Since F 1 is nonempty, so is F 2 . We may write the sum
h j , where each h j is a positive linear combination of at most two functions in the family F 1 ∪ F 2 , such that h j (s ) ≥ 0 for all j.
8 By Proposition 1, h j is an SC function, so
we have h j (s ) ≥ 0 for all j. This gives
so we obtain F (s ) > 0. QED Proof of Theorem 1: If f (s, t ) and f (s, t ) violate signed-ratio monotonicity, Proposition 1 says that there are α, β > 0 such that αf (s, t )+βf (s, t ) is not an SC function. The necessity of signed-ratio monotonicity is clear since we can choose µ to be the measure with µ({t }) = α and µ({t }) = β and µ(J) = 0 for all J ∈ Σ not containing t or t .
To prove the sufficiency of the condition, consider s > s and suppose the ranges of f (s , ·) and f (s , ·) are contained in some bounded interval I. Partition I into disjoint intervals I j , j = 1, 2, ..., K, with a mesh of 1/m. Denote byT (j, k) the subset of T such that for t ∈T (j, k), we have f (s , t) ∈ I j and f (s , t) ∈ I k . Note that the collection of setsT (j, k), with j and k ranging between 1 and K form a partition of T . Define the simple functions 9 f m (s , ·) and f m (s , ·) in the following way: for t ∈T (j, k), choose f m (s , t) = f (s ,t jk ) and f m (s , t) = f (s ,t jk ) for somet jk ∈T (j, k). This construction guarantees that for s = s , s , f m (s, ·) tends f (s , ·) pointwise; it also guarantees that for s = s , s , T f m (s, t) dµ(t) is a finite sum of the form 1≤j, k≤K α jk f (s,t jk ). Lemma 1 guarantees that, if T f m (s , t) dµ(t) > 0 then T f m (s , t) dµ(t) > 0 (because both integrals are finite sums). Since f is bounded and µ is a finite measure, the dominated convergence theorem is applicable. Taking limits, we obtain the following result ( ):
To complete the proof we need to establish the following claims:
is not the case, there must bet such that f (s ,t) > 0. Thus, for any α > 0, T f (s , t) dµ(t) + 8 One procedure is the following. Choose the f i function with the smallest absolute value at s and add it to a fraction of a function having the opposite sign at s , so that they sum to zero. Repeat the procedure with the remaining functions; this will terminate after finitely many steps. For example, suppose
, where each square bracketed term gives an h j function. 9 By a simple function we mean a measurable function that takes finitely many distinct values.
10 Since this is true for any α > 0, we conclude that T f (s , t) dµ(t) ≥ 0. To prove (b), first note that the problem is trivial if f (s , t) ≥ 0 for all t. Suppose instead that there ist such that f (s ,t) < 0. Assuming that T f (s , t) dµ(t) > 0, choose β > 0 sufficiently small, so that T f (s , t) dµ(t) + βf (s ,t) > 0. By result ( ), T f (s , t) dµ(t) + βf (s ,t) ≥ 0. Since f (s ,t) < 0, we obtain T f (s , t) dµ(t) > 0. QED Proof of Theorem 2: Denote the vectors in Π n−1 i=1 T i byt. DefineF (s,t) = Tn f (s,t, t n )dµ n (t n ). Note that conditions (i) and (ii) guarantee (through the application of Theorem 1) thatF is an SC function of (s,t). We claim thatF has the following properties: ∀i, ∀s ∈ S, and ∀t >t , (I) the functionsF (s,t ) andF (s,t ) of s ∈ S satisfy signed-ratio monotonicity and (II) the functionsF (s , t i ,t −i ) andF (s , t i ,t −i ) of t i ∈ T i satisfy signed-ratio monotonicity.
In other words,F inherit the properties (i) and (ii) from F . We can then repeat the exercise and integrateF by t n−1 and so on. Eventually, we obtain signed-ratio monotonicity for the functions G(s, t 1 ) and G(s, t 1 ) of s, where
It is clear that if (i) and (ii) implies (I), then another application of the same result guarantees that (II) follows from (ii).
11 So we need only show (I). By Proposition 1, it suffices to show thatF (s,t ) + ΓF (s,t ) is an SC function of s for any Γ > 0. By Theorem 1, this is true if, for any t n and t n in T n , the functions g(s, t n ) and g(s, t n ) of s obey signed-ratio monotonicity, where g(s, t n ) = f (s,t , t n ) + Γf (s,t , t n ). Note that, by Proposition 1 and condition (i), g is an SC function of s. By Proposition 1 again, we need only show that 
T n is totally ordered, there is no loss of generality in assuming that t n ≥ t n . Note that g(s, t n )
is an SC function of t n , by condition (ii), so if g(s * , t n ) ≥ 0 we also have g(s * , t n ) ≥ 0. In this case, we can let A 1 (s) = g(s, t n ) and A 2 (s) = g(s, t n ). Suppose instead that g(s * , t n ) > 0 and g(s * , t n ) < 0. Since f is an SC function, f (s * ,t , t n ) > 0 while f (s * ,t , t n ) may be negative (Case 1) or nonnegative (Case 2).
Case 1. Given that g(s * , t n ) > 0, there is α ∈ (0, 1) so that A 1 (s) = Qf (s,t , t n ) + αQΓf (s,t , t n ) satisfies A 1 (s * ) = 0. Since (t , t n ) and (t , t n ) are ordered, condition (i)
Case 2. Notice that φ(s) = Qf (s,t , t n ) + f (s,t , t n ) + Γ Qf (s,t , t n ) + f (s,t , t n ) . The map fromt to Qf (s,t, t n ) + f (s,t, t n ) is an SC map. This follows from repeated application
Qf (s * ,t , t n ) + f (s * ,t , t n ) may be of either sign. Define A 1 and A 2 by A 1 (s) = Qf (s,t , t n ) + βf (s,t , t n ) and 
properties (a)-(c).QED
The proofs of Propositions 2 and 3 require the following two lemmas.
Lemma 2. Suppose that h : R → R is twice differentiable, with h > 0 and −h (z)/h (z) decreasing in z, i.e., obeys DARA. Then for any a 1 < a 2 , b 1 < b 2 , a 1 ≤ b 1 , and
Proof: It suffices to show that
where the final inequality holds because DARA guarantees that f is convex and, since h is strictly increasing, h(a 1 + x) < h(a 2 + x), h(b 1 + x) < h(b 2 + x), h(a 1 + x) ≤ h(b 1 + x), and h(a 2 + x) ≤ h(b 2 + x). QED Lemma 3. Let X and T be totally ordered sets, S a partially ordered set, and φ a map from X × S × T to R. For x , x ∈ X with x > x , suppose that function of t. Suppose Π(x ; s, t )−Π(x ; s, t ) ≥ (>) 0. Then x P (x ; t )−x P (x ; t ) ≥ (>) 0 since C is increasing in x. Furthermore, we have 12 0 ≤ (<) x P (x ; t ) − x P (x ; t ) = x P (x ; t ) P (x ; t ) − x P (x ; t ) ≤ x P (x ; t ) P (x ; t ) − x P (x ; t ) = x P (x ; t ) − x P (x ; t )
The inequality is true since {ln P (·; t)} t∈T obeys increasing differences and P is increasing in t. We conclude that Π(x ; s, t ) − Π(x ; s, t ) ≥ (>) 0. QED
